The Impact of Investor Horizon on Say-on-Pay Voting

Konstantinos Stathopoulos, Georgios Voulgaris

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

19 Citeringar (Scopus)


Shareholder investment horizons have a significant impact on say-on-pay voting patterns. Short-term investors are more likely to avoid expressing opinion on executive pay proposals by casting an abstaining vote. They vote against board proposals on pay only in cases where the CEO already receives excessive pay levels. In contrast, long-term investors typically cast favourable votes. According to our findings, this is due to effective monitoring rather than collusion with the management. Overall, investor heterogeneity in terms of investment horizons helps explain say-on-pay voting, in particular the low levels of say-on-pay dissent, which have recently raised questions over the efficiency of this corporate governance mechanism.
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftBritish Journal of Management
Sidor (från-till)796-818
Antal sidor23
StatusPublicerad - 2016
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift


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