The No Surcharge Rule and Merchant Competition

Frans Saxén

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

We analyze the no surcharge rule (NSR) and its impact on merchant com- petition by comparing different surcharging regimes. Any constraint on surcharging, including the NSR is shown to be a competition-softening device. A NSR may induce socially excessive card use. Allowing imperfectly competitive merchants to surcharge may lead to socially too little card use. Under a NSR, increased cost of card accep- tance increases all prices, even the prices of a merchant not accepting cards. Under the NSR cards yielding no social surplus may be viable. This is not the case without the NSR. Card-use rewards may hurt consumers.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Volym14
Utgåva1
Sidor (från-till)39-66
Antal sidor28
ISSN1566-1679
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 2014
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi
  • KOTA2013

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